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THE NATIONAL TREND OF ABOLISHING ACTIONS FOR
THE ALIENATION OF A SPOUSE'S AFFECTION AND
MISSISSIPPI's REFUSAL TO FOLLOW SUIT
Jamie Heard
I. INTRODUCTION
The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and po-
litical theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or uncon-
scious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllo-
gism in determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned. The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We
must alternately consult history and existing theories of leg-
islation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand
the combination of the two into new products at every
stage.'
As accurately observed by Oliver W. Holmes, for the law to be effec-
tive, it must evolve with the realities of human society. The right of a plain-
tiff spouse's recovery for the alienation of his or her spouse's affection by a
third party's intentional interference with the marriage has its origin in the
outdated common law notion that wives were the property of their hus-
bands2 and no longer serves an effective purpose in today's society. An
action for alienation has become little more than a vehicle for extortion
and harassment and does not, in any way, protect the familial relationship,
as is alleged by supporters of the preservation of the action.3 Accordingly,
Mississippi should join the majority of states in the nation that have already
legislatively or judicially abolished the action.'
To quote from a 1976 Washington Court of Appeals opinion, this Note
will explain that the "justification for the abolition of such actions lies in
the fictitiousness of [the action's] underlying assumptions, the unwilling-
ness of courts to modify the governing rules [of such actions] to accord with
social realities, and the ineptitude of the judicial process to prevent vicious
1. Wyman v. Wallace 549 P.2d 71, n.1 (Wash. App. 1976) (quoting 0. W. HOLMES. JR., THE
COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881)).
2. See discussion infra part II.
3. See discussion infra part V.
4. See discussion infra parts III and V.
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settlements out of court."5 This Note will first discuss the general history
and nature of the tort of alienation of a spouse's affection6 and, in an effort
to persuade the courts and legislature of Mississippi to abolish the tort, it
will also discuss the legislative and judicial abolition of alienation actions
by a vast majority of other states in the nation.' This Note will also discuss
the constitutionality of such statutory abolishment,8 the arguments in oppo-
sition of such abolishment,' and exceptions to the general rule of abolish-
ment.'o Finally, this Note will discuss Mississippi's position on the issue"
and explain why Mississippi should join the list of states that prohibit alien-
ation actions.12
II. HISTORY OF THE TORT
The tort of alienation of affection has its origins in the common law
theory that a wife and her services, society, conjugal affection, and consor-
tium were the property of her husband." When the husband experienced a
loss of or an injury to these so-called "property interests" in his wife as the
result of another man's wrongful influence, the common law accorded him
an action at law against the wrongdoer. In essence, the injured husband
was compensated for the loss of his wife's services, society, conjugal affec-
tion, and consortium with a monetary award.14
At common law, there were two causes of action that could be brought
against a third party for his intentional interference with a man's marital
relationship with his wife - enticement and seduction.'" The tort of entice-
ment "involved assisting or inducing a wife to leave her husband by means
of fraud, violence, or persuasion."16 By definition, enticement required a
physical separation of the husband and wife caused by the third party's
wrongful inducement." Also referred to as abduction, the tort of entice-
ment has evolved into what is now commonly known as the tort of aliena-
tion of affection."8 The second basis for recovery - an action for seduction
(commonly known today as criminal conversation) - only "required an
adulterous relationship between the plaintiff's spouse and the defen-
dant."' 9 But unlike the tort of enticement, "no physical separation of the
5. Wyman, 549 P.2d at 73.
6. See discussion infra part II.
7. See discussion infra parts III and V.
8. See discussion infra part IV.
9. See discussion infra part VI.
10. See discussion infra part VII.
11. See discussion infra part VIII.
12. See discussion infra part IX.
13. Moulin v. Monteleone, 115 So. 447, 450 (La. 1928).
14. Id.
15. Michele Crissman, Alienation of Affection: An Ancient Tort - But Still Alive in South Dakota,
48 S.D. L. REv. 518, 519 (2003) (citing Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992)).
16. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF
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husband and wife was necessary" for the husband's recovery of damages
for the seduction of his wife.20
One of the first actions for enticement, or rather, for alienation of a
spouse's affection, was brought before an English Court of Common Pleas
in 1745.21 In Winsmore v. Greenback, the plaintiff husband alleged that the
defendant paramour "maliciously and wickedly intending to injure the
plaintiff . .. and to alienate the affection of the wife from the plaintiff ...
persuaded procured and enticed the said wife to depart and absent herself
from the plaintiff."2 2 The court recognized that the husband's "exclusive
and legally enforceable right to his wife's services" entitled him to compen-
sation for his loss. 23
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a wife was considered in-
ferior to her husband and therefore had no property rights in her husband
as he did in her.24 As a result, actions against a third party for enticement
or seduction were only available as means of recovery to the superior hus-
band.2 5 The common law concept that a husband had property rights in his
wife justified his recovery for the loss of these interests as a result of a third
party's enticement or seduction of his wife during these earlier times.
However, the social evolution of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries threatened the torts' rationale.2 6 The extension of legal rights
to women - such as the right to own property and the right to personally
recover for their own personal injury - and the growing trend of equal legal
treatment of both males and females negated the contention that women
could not pursue an action for the enticement or seduction of their hus-
bands. 27 In light of the wives' acquisition of such rights, the courts "were
then confronted with the issues as to the continued viability of the tortious
causes of actions. Because the derivation of these torts was based on the
legal inferiority of women, courts could reasonably determine to either
[(1)] deprive their use to a husband or [(2)] extend their use to a wife."28
The courts chose the latter and then realized that the "[e]xtension of these
rights of action to the wife necessitated adjusting their rationale." 29 Ac-
cordingly, the torts of enticement and seduction, now referred to as aliena-
tion of affection and criminal conversation, "came to be seen as means to
preserve marital harmony by deterring wrongful interference" with the
marriage by a third party.3 0
20. Id.
21. Crissman, supra note 15, at 519 (citing Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on 'Heart
Balm', 33 MICH. L. REv. 979, 992 (1935)).
22. Wright v. Lester, 126 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Ga. 1962) (quoting Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes
577. 125 Eng. Repts. 1330 (1745)).
23. Crissman, supra note 15 at 519 (citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1224 (Utah 1983)).
24. Moulin v. Monteleone, 115 So. 447, 450 (La. 1928).
25. Id.
26. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992). .
27. Moulin, 115 So. at 450-51; Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424.
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However, it seems as though that now the torts of alienation of affec-
tion and criminal conversation are no longer useful in the preservation of
the marital relationship." Rather, as most jurisdictions have recognized,
an alienation action has become less compensatory and more vindictive in
nature and does not, in fact, protect a marital relationship from third party
interference. The New Jersey Superior Court observed:
The public ha[s] come to look upon 'heart balm' suits as
devices for extracting large sums of money without proper
justification. They [a]re a fruitful source of coercion, extor-
tion and blackmail. Manufactured suits, with their always
present threat of publicity, [a]re often used to force a settle-
ment . . . [T]here is good reason to believe that even genu-
ine actions [a]re 'brought more frequently than not, with
purely mercenary or vindictive motives; that it is impossible
to compensate for such damage with what has derisively
been called 'heart balm' . . . and that no preventative pur-
pose is served, since such torts seldom are committed with
deliberate plan.' 33
In light of the somewhat arbitrary shift in justifications for the preser-
vation of the action and the tort's ineffectiveness in actually preserving the
marital relationship, courts and legislatures across the nation have abol-
ished the tort of alienation of affection, as well as the tort of criminal
conversation.34
III. LEGISLATIVE ABOLISHMENT
Since Indiana's legislature first abolished the tort of alienation of af-
fection in 1935,35 thirty-one states have followed suit by enacting similar
statutory prohibitions against such actions, including the states of Colorado
and Minnesota.3 1 Section 13-20-201 of the Colorado Revised Statutes An-
notated rationalizes that actions based on alienation of affection, as well as
31. See discussion infra parts III and IV.
32. See discussion infra parts III and IV.
33. Magierowski v. Buckley, 121 A.2d 749, 756 (N.J. Super. 1956) (quoting PROSSER AND KEE-
TON, THE LAW OF TORTS 697 (2d ed. 1955)).
34. See discussion infra parts III and IV. While criminal conversation and alienation of affection
are closely related actions, they are considered as separate and distinct torts for the purpose of this
Note and accordingly, the tort of criminal conversation will not be discussed in detail.
35. William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save Families:
Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 1007 (2001) (citing 1935 Ind. Acts c.
208, codified as IND. CODE § 34-12-2-1).
36. ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (1977); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
118-106 (1989); CAL CIV. CODE § 43.5 (1939); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-202 (2009); CONN. GEN
STAT. § 52-572b (1967); DEL CODE ANN. § 3924 (1972); D.C. CODE § 16-923 (1977): FLA. STAT.
§ 771.01(1945); GA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-17 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-208 (1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 301 (1985); Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 3-103 (1984); Mass. GEN LAWS ch. 207, § 47B
(1985); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.2901 (1961); MINN. STAT. § 553.02 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21.
188 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (1935): N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 80-a (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-06 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (1978); OR. REV.
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those based on criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to
marry, have "been subjected to grave abuses, caused extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation, and pecuniary damage to many persons
wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing who were merely the victims
of circumstances."" The Colorado statute further provides that these so
called "heart balm" actions "have been exercised by unscrupulous persons
for their unjust enrichment, and have furnished vehicles for the commission
or attempted commission of crime and in many cases have resulted in the
perpetration of frauds."" Minnesota's statutory probation of the tort of
alienation of affection adds that these actions "have caused intimidation
and harassment to innocent persons."3 9 In accordance with these consider-
ations and others, thirty-two states have enacted similar legislation to re-
flect that "the best interests of the people . . . will be served by the
abolition" of actions based upon alienation of affection.40
Three other states - Montana, New Hampshire and Oklahoma - have
legislatively abolished the tort as it pertains to the alienation of affection of
a spouse but are silent as to the alienation of the affection of a parent or
child.4 1 It has been argued that Montana's statutory exclusion of an action
for alienation of a spouse's affection implicitly creates a cause of action for
the alienation of a child's affection - expression unius est exclusion alter-
ius.4 2 However, Montana's Supreme Court observed that the abolition of
one cause of action does not necessarily create another and therefore re-
fused to recognize the claim. 43 Oklahoma's Court of Appeals has also ad-
dressed the silence of its statute and similarly held that children do not
have a cause of action against a third party arising out of the alienation of
their parent's affection.44
Unlike the others, Pennsylvania's "heart balm" statute provides that
the tort of alienation is abolished except where the defendant is a parent,
brother, sister, or a person formerly in loco parentis to the spouse of plain-
tiff.4 5 In other words, where the affection of the plaintiff's spouse is alien-
ated by the plaintiff's immediate in-laws or "a person taking on all or some
of the responsibilities" of a guardian or caretaker,46 the action may be
STAT. § 31.980 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-42 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-701 (1989); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 1.107 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (1977);
W.VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (2009); Wis. STAT. § 768.01 (2009); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-23-101 (1941).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-201 (1937).
38. Id.
39. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1978).
40. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.370 (1979). .
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (2009); OKLA. STAT.
§ 8.1 (1976). See infra part VII, for a discussion of actions involving the alienation of a family member's
affection
42. "The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another." See Vieke v. Heikkinen, 120
P.3d 809 (Referenced in Decisions Without Published Opinions Table), 2005 WL 1633561, *2 (Mo.
2005).
43. Vieke, 2005 WL 1633561.
44. Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d 1335 (Oki. App. 1974).
45. 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1901.
46. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 652 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005).
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maintained. Regardless of the extent of these statutes' abolition of aliena-
tion actions, the mere existence of such statutes demonstrates the severity
of the impact that alienation actions have had on the public and the obvi-
ous need for a legislative or judicial response.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE ABOLISHMENT
The constitutionality of the legislative abolishment of the tort of alien-
ation of affection has been questioned by those who have been denied re-
covery pursuant to such statutory prohibitions of alienation actions.
However, where challenged, the so-called "heart balm" statutes have been
consistently held constitutional, with only one exception.4 7 In Heck v.
Schupp, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the state's former statute
prohibiting alienation actions based on a rather vague combination of the
state's constitutional provisions.4 8 However, no other court has followed
the logic of the Heck court.49
The constitutionality of the statutory abolition of alienation actions
has been questioned in light of state constitutional "open courts" provi-
sions providing that "[e]very person out to find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, prop-
erty or reputation ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely . . . com-
pletely and without denial, promptly, and without delay.""o In response to
an argument that the abolishing statute denies the injured party a remedy
for the wrongful act of alienation committed against him, a Texas Court of
Appeals held that the legislative purpose and rationale of the abolishing
statute - namely, to curtail the abusive nature of alienation actions - out-
weighs a litigant's right of recovery under the "heart balm" statutes." This
is especially true where other avenues of relief are available in lieu of an
alienation of affection action, such as an action for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress or the favorable utilization of the actions of the way-
ward spouse in the equitable division of marital property in the resulting
divorce action. 2
It has also been argued that the statutory abolishment on alienation
actions "impairs the obligation of a private contract of marriage which
amounts to a violation of the United States Constitution [providing] that
'no State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts.'" 5 3
Challengers contend that "by abolishing the causes of action for alienation
47. Magierowski, 121 A.2d at 757-58 (citing Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. 1946)).
48. Heck, 68 N.E.2d 466. See infra Part VI for a discussion regarding Illinois' current statute
allowing recovery for alienation actions but severely limiting the damages that may be assessed.
49. Magierowski, 121 A.2d at 758.
50. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 466 (quoting ILL. CONST. art II, §19).
51. Smith v. Smith, 126 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing Hearings on HB 203 Before the
H. Comm. on Judiciary, 70th Leg., R.S. (March 16, 1987)).
52. Id.
53. Slusher v. Oeder, 476 N.E.2d 714, 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art.I, § 10,
cl. 1).
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of affection and criminal conversation, the state is encouraging the entice-
ment of one spouse by a stranger to the marriage, thereby creating the
potential for a breach of the marriage contract in the form of divorce or
dissolution."5 4 However, in response, one court has stated that "marriage
has never been regarded as a contract within the constitutional prohibitions
against laws impairing the obligation of contracts." 5
Challengers of the abolishing statutes' constitutionality also contend
that the statutes deny due process and/or equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under similar
state constitutional provisions.5 6 However, the United States Supreme
Court has explicitly declared that "[a] person has no property, no vested
interest, in any rule of the common law."" The Supreme Court of Ohio, in
addressing the constitutionality of its statutory prohibition of alienation ac-
tions, rationalized that because "there is no property or vested right in any
of the rules of the common law . . . they may be added to or repealed by
legislative authority," 58 so long as "it is to attain a permissible legislative
objective." 59 The Ohio court noted the widespread statutory abolition of
alienation actions and added that "the [United States] Supreme Court, by
declining to disturb lower-court verdicts on the issue [of the constitutional-
ity], has affirmed the principal that the abolition of suits for alienation of
affection and related actions is constitutional."6 0
V. JUDICIAL ABOLISHMENT
Where the legislature has not statutorily abolished the tort of aliena-
tion of a spouse's affection, the judiciary of some states has taken it upon
itself to do away with the action.6 1 In 1928, the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana was faced with the task of determining whether a right of action even
existed for the alienation of a wife's affection in Louisiana.62 In Moulin v.
Monteleone, Augustin Moulin sued his wife's paramour, Frank Montele-
one, after returning from a business trip to find his wife living with Mon-
teleone.6 3 The wife confessed to Moulin that she was intimate with
Monteleone and that she would no longer be living with Moulin.' As
damages, Moulin sought $80,000 for "the deprivation of [his] wife's love
and affection . . . the loss of her fidelity and assistance . . . the loss of the
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Moore v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 56 N.E.2d 520 (Ohio Ct. App. 1043)).
56. Strock v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (Ohio 1988) (citing Haskins v. Bias, 441 N.E.2d 842
(1981)).
57. Id. (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
58. Id. (quoting Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 128 N.E. 73 (Ohio 1920)).
59. Id. (citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929)).
60. Id.
61. Moulin, 115 So. at 447.
62. Id. at 448.
63. Id. at 456.
64. Id.
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companionship and society of [his] wife . . . the humiliation and mental
anguish which [he] endured[,] and . . . the breaking up of his home."6 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized immediately that there was
no pertinent law to be found on the subject of a spouse's love and affection
or the alienation thereof in the statutes or jurisprudence of the state.6 6
Chief Justice O'Niell, writing for the majority, rationalized that perhaps the
reason that no such statutes exist is "because the law undertakes only to
control and regulate human conduct - not human nature." 67 The court felt
that there were, however, several reasons why none of the lawyers of the
state's bar have ever, prior to that moment, instituted an action for dam-
ages based on the alienation of a wife's affection - one of those reasons
being probably the most-cited rationale for the tort's abolition."
The court explained that at common law:
[the] right of action for damages for alienation of a wife's
affection [wa]s in some measure based upon the same obso-
lete idea that the wife [wals one of the husband's chattels,
and that her companionship, her services and her affection
[we]re his property, for the loss of which, by wrongful in-
ducement on the part of another man, the husband out to be
compensated with money.69
Quoting from Thomas M. Cooley's treatise on the law of torts, the
court noted that when we "direct attention to the remedies which, at com-
mon law, the husband might have against third persons for violation of his
rights as husband [such as the right to bring an action for the alienation of
his wife's affection], we find them all grounded upon or permeated with the
ideas which mark their origin in a rough and uncultivated society.""o The
court presumed that the antiquated notions upon which the tort of aliena-
tion of affection was founded, along with other considerations,7 1 were re-
sponsible for the fact that no such right of action had been asserted in
65. Id.
66. Id. at 448.
67. Moulin, 115 So. at 448.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 450.
70. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACr 465 (3d ed. 1878)).
71. Id. The Court also recognized that, not only is the tort based on antiquated societal views of
marriage, there are other reasons why an action based on alienation of affection has never been initi-
ated in Louisiana. Namely, there is no right of action for damages in Louisiana against one who in-
duces another to violate his or her contract with a third person absent fraud or deception. Moulin, 115
So. at 449 (citing Kline v. Eubanks, 33 So. 211 (La. 1902)). Because marriage was viewed as a civil
contract and because "there is no element of such deception or fraud when a man persuades the wife of
another to breach her contract by violating her marriage vow," there is, therefore, no avenue of recov-
ery under a breach of contract theory. Id. Additionally, at the time of the decision, punitive and exem-
plary damages were not authorized in civil cases. Id. at 448 (citing Serio v. American Brewing Co., 74
So. 998 (La. 1917)). And because damages for alienation of affection were essentially punitive, a mone-
tary award was not available to the injured spouse in an action for alienation of affection and therefore,
there was no incentive to even bring suit in the first place. Id. Further, the Court noted that, in the
320 [VOL. 28:313
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Louisiana until Moulin.7 2 Because at the time, no such action had been
asserted in Louisiana, the Court held that no such cause of action could
then be maintained and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action.
The Moulin Court did not, per se, abolish the tort of alienation of af-
fection, since it held that such a cause of action had not been previously
"recognized or ratified" by Louisiana statute or case law in the first place.7 4
However, the court did attempt to explain why the tort had not been so
recognized in the state, citing to the antiquated notions upon which the tort
was founded. The observations of the Moulin opinion, especially with re-
gard to the outdated theory behind the alienation actions, would provide
the framework for abolition of the tort by later courts.
The Supreme Court of Washington cites favorably to the Moulin opin-
ion in its 1980 decision to abolish the tort of alienation of affection. In
Wyman v. Wallace, the Court pointed out that the "action for alienation of
a spouse's affection [was] a judicially created doctrine" in Washington, "ex-
ist[ing] [at] common law, and. . . adopted into the state's jurisprudence but
not specifically provided for by statutory legislation.7 6 Therefore, it was
within the Court's judicial power to abolish the tort, since "a rule of law
which has its origins in the common law and which has not been specifically
enacted by the legislature may be modified or abolished by the courts when
such revision is mandated by changed conditions.""
The Washington Supreme Court quoted and summarily agreed with
the lower court's reasons for abolishing the tort." The Washington Court
of Appeals began by asking the question, "Should the common-law action
for the alienation of affection of a spouse be abolished?"7 9 The court re-
sponded in the affirmative and explained that "[w]hen a judicial conclusion
of the past which established a public policy comes again before the courts,
accepted assumptions should be reexamined in the light of current condi-
tions and thinking."s0 Accordingly, the opinion goes on to "question the
action for alienation of affection in the light of contemporary opinion, hav-
ing in mind the ramifications . . . of the impact of the action upon those
[parties] involved . . . directly or indirectly.""
The Washington court discussed several aspects of an action based on
alienation of affection, including the motives for the initiation of such an
absence of a statute conferring a right of action for damages for alienation of a wife's affection, there is
no such right. Id. at 451.
72. Moulin. 115 So. at 452.
73. Id. at 452, 457.
74. Id.
75. Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980) (on Petition for Reconsideration of Wyman v.
Wallace, 588 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1979)).
76. Id. at 453 (citing Beach v. Brown, 55 P.46 (1898)).
77. Id. (quoting Wyman, 588 P.2d at 1134).
78. Id. at 455.
79. Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71 (Wash. App. 1976).
80. Id. (citing Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hop. Ass'n, 260 P.2d 765 (Wash 1953)).
81. Id. at 71-72.
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action in the first place.8 2 It observed that a major motivating factor in
bringing a suit for alienation of affection is the plaintiff's need to exact
revenge, humiliation, and punishment on the paramour or former spouse.
Accordingly, in an effort to avoid such results at any cost, a defendant par-
amour is essentially coerced into a monetary settlement with the plaintiff
spouse in exchange for the preservation of the parties' reputations - a pro-
cess that the Court of Appeals referred to as "legalized blackmail." 84
Along with concerns regarding the impact of such proceedings upon
any children indirectly involved" and with the indefinite standards for as-
sessing damages,8 6 the court also pointed out the fallacy in the notion that
the action prevents misconduct and protects the marital relationship.8 1 It
rationalized that a solid marriage is not one where the affection of one
spouse is subject to alienation by a third party.88 According to the court,
"viable, contented marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer of the
Nineteenth Century melodrama, though this is what the suit for alienation
assumes. In fact the break-up is the product of many influences."8 9 In light
of these considerations, the court found "so little possible social utility in
the action, when balanced against the social and individual harm that it can
cause, that [it] c[ould] not justify [an action based on alienation of affec-
tion] in contemporary society."9 0 The Court of Appeals dismissed the ac-
tion and the Supreme Court of Washington ultimately affirmed.9 1
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Iowa joined Washington in the judicial
abolishment of the tort of alienation of affection, citing to both the Moulin
and Wyman opinions.9 2 In Fundermann v. Mickelson, the court boldly
stated it has "become convinced that there is inherent and fatal contradic-
tion in the term 'alienation of affection."' 9 3 Justice Harris, writing for the
majority, explained that "alienation belies the affection."94 In other words,
true or genuine affection is not, by definition, subject to alienation. Ac-
cording to the Fundermann Court (in agreement with the logic of the Wy-
man Court):
82. Id. at 72-74.
83. Id. at 73.
84. Id. at 72 (citing M. GROSSMAN, THE NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 313 (1947);
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §10.2 at 267 (1968)).





90. Id. at 73.
91. Wyman, 549 P.2d at 74; Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980). It should be noted
that the Supreme Court initially reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that "clear reasons and an
evident factual basis" for abolition of the long-standing cause of action were lacking. Wyman v. Wal-
lace. 588 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Wash, 1979). However, upon a discretionary review granted by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, that opinion vacated by Wyman, 615 P.2d 452.
92. Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981).
93. Id. at 791.
94. Id.
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The action has survived in the hope that it affords some pro-
tection to existing family relationships. But this lofty hope
has proven illusory. Human experience is that the affection
of persons who are devoted and faithful are not susceptible
to larceny no matter how cunning or stealthful. And it is
folly to hope any longer that a married person who has be-
come inclined to philander can be preserved within an affec-
tionate marriage by the threat of an alienation suit.95
The Iowa court also noted a very real problem with alienation trials by
stating that where a jury must decide which came first for the purposes of
causation, the breakdown of the marriage or the alienating misconduct, the
jury must do so "after learning of conduct of which they strongly disap-
prove and which society condemns."96 The court opined that "[i]t is illogi-
cal to pretend that juries can dispassionately resolve the factual disputes in
alienation suits, such as causation, in the same manner as in other cases.""
However, it clarifies that notwithstanding the potential prejudice a par-
amour risks in the face of a jury, it is actually the theory of recovery that is
flawed.98 Noting the "unmistakable trend away from allowing alienation
suits," the Iowa Supreme Court joined Washington in the judicial abolish-
ment of the tort.99
In 1986, the Idaho Supreme Court was also faced with the decision to
abolish the tort of alienation of affection. 100 However, in O'Neil v. Schuck-
ardt, the court was faced with a very different defendant than the paramour
who is normally sued by an injured spouse.10 1 In O'Neil, the plaintiff
spouse brought an alienation action against his wife's mother and sister,
her church, and several of its leaders and members.102 The facts of the case
suggest that the defendants convinced the plaintiff's wife that their mar-
riage was invalid in the eyes of God because the plaintiff was not Catholic
nor had he taken instruction in the faith and that she could not, therefore,
live with the plaintiff as his wife since to do so would be to commit moral
sin.1 o3 The plaintiff husband brought the alienation suit on behalf of him-
self and the children born of the marriage.104
In its decision to abolish the tort, the Supreme Court of Idaho consid-
ered the Wyman opinion to be directly on point, citing favorably its reasons




98. Fundermann, 304 N.W.2d at 791.
99. Id. at 792.
100. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1987).
101. Id. at 695.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 694.
105. Id. at 697.
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existence of the tort and unequivocally rejected the arguments in support
of its preservation.' 06
The action for alienation of affections purportedly exists to
discourage third persons from weakening marriages. How-
ever, a marriage is not likely to falter without the active par-
ticipation of one of its members. Never has there been any
documentation that the existence of the action actually pro-
tects marriages. In fact, once suit has been brought, it noti-
fies the public that the marriage is unstable, embarrasses the
spouses and their children, and adds more tension to the
family relationship. . . . The unplanned nature of the tort, at
least where sexual activities are involved, makes the threat
of any damage suit unlikely to deter the culpable conduct
that has allegedly interfered with the marriage.0 7
The Court cited several other rationales in support of the tort's abol-
ishment, some of which merely echoed the logic of the Wyman and
Fundermann Courts. It noted the ill effects of the action on children in-
volved in the marriage, the extortionate use of alienation suits by plaintiff
spouses looking for a quick monetary settlement, and the difficulty of de-
termining whether the defendant or the alienated spouse (who was argua-
bly not happy with the marriage in the first place) is primarily responsible
for the alienation.1 0 8 The court also agreed with the earlier Fundermann
opinion that, in light of the intangible nature of the injuries involved in an
alienation action, "damages awards have few standards, making it easier
for verdicts to be tainted by passion and prejudice." 109 The Supreme Court
of Idaho considered these factors to outweigh any benefit of an alienation
action and abolished it accordingly. 1 o
Citing the Wyman, Fundermann, and O'Neil opinions, Kentucky,
South Carolina, and Missouri followed suit and judicially abolished the tort
of alienation of affection, all focusing their opinions on the antiquated no-
tions upon which the tort is based and the flawed rationale upon which the
tort has been thus far maintained."' As stated by the Supreme Court of
Missouri, echoing the opinions of the highest courts of Kentucky and South
Carolina, "the tort of alienation of affection can no longer be adequately
106. O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698.
107. Id. (citing The Suit of Alienation of Affection: Can its Existence be Justified Today?, 56




111. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992); Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1992);
Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231 (Mo. 2003).
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justified."1 2 The Missouri court explained that "the original property con-
cepts justifying the tort are inconsistent with modern law [and] [t]he mod-
ern justification that the tort preserves marriages is a fiction." 13
VI. ALIENATION ACTIONS STILL RECOGNIZED IN SOME STATES
While the majority of states have either judicially or legislatively abol-
ished the tort of alienation of affection, a handful of states still recognize
alienation as a viable cause of action, including New Mexico," 4 Hawaii,'
South Dakota," 6 Illinois,"' Utah'" 8 and, of course, Mississippi." 9 In the
face of the growing trend of abolishment of the tort, the courts of these
states have not, however, set forth persuasive arguments in support of the
preservation of the right of action. Two of these courts have acknowledged
the trend of abolishment and even expressed their dissatisfaction with the
action as an avenue for the recovery of damages. However, finding them-
selves powerless to judicially abolish the tort, the tort still remains a feasi-
ble avenue of recovery in those states.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed the public pol-
icy concerns with alienation actions but noted that in light of the statutory
nature of the action, and absent a constitutional defect in the statute, the
Court is "compelled to leave the cause of action intact and instead defer to
the legislature's ability to decide if there is a need for its elimination." 120
The court explained that the members of the bench "are not legislative
overlords empowered to eliminate laws whenever [they] surmise that [the
laws] are no longer relevant or necessary."121
Nonetheless, the South Dakota court recognized, in earlier opinions,
the national trend of abolishing the tort and that the tort has "outlived [its]
usefulness and [is an] 'archaic holdover from an era when wives were con-
sidered the chattel of their spouse."'12 2 The court quoted from its plurality
opinion in Hunt v. Hunt 2 3 to reflect the strong policy arguments previously
advanced by the members of the court in favor of abolishment.12 4
The underlying rationale for alienation suits, that is, the
preservation of the marriage, is ludicrous. And it is folly to
112. Helsel, 107 S.W.3d at 233.
113. Id.
114. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1326 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Thompson v. Chapman,
600 P.2d 302 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979)).
115. Hunt v. Chang, 594 P.2d 118, 123 (Haw. 1979).
116. Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 616 (S.D. 1999).
117. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/0.01 (2009).
118. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah 1991).
119. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1020 (Miss. 2007).
120. Veeder, 589 N.W.2d at 616 (citing S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-7 (2008)). South Dakota derives
the action of alienation of affection from statutory law providing that "[tlhe rights of personal relation
forbid the abduction or enticement of a wife from her husband."
121. Id.
122. Id. at 615 (quoting Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 821).
123. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 822.
124. Veeder, 589 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting Hunt, 309 N.w.2d at 822).
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hope any longer that a married person who has become in-
clined to philander can be preserved within an affectionate
marriage by the threat of an alienation suitFalse Where ...
neither party holds the marriage in the high regard that it
should be held, the existence of . . . alienation of affec-
tions . . . as [a remedy] fosters bitterness, promotes vexa-
tious lawsuits, uses the marriage as a means of blackmail
and character assassination, puts the marriage in the mar-
ketplace, and generally exposes the marriage to a public
cleansing with a price tag attached upon it. 12 5
However, despite the court's seemingly strong position advocating the
abolition of alienation of affection, the action still remains an available ave-
nue of redress in South Dakota.126
Similarly, while the right of action has not been abolished in New
Mexico, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico has stated that it "look[s]
with disfavor on claims for damages based upon alienation of affection."12 7
In Thompson v. Chapman, the court added that if it had the power to do
so, it "would follow in the footsteps of Wyman v. Wallace"128 in abolishing
the tort.129 While the Supreme Court of New Mexico "has not yet formally
abandoned the doctrine," it has cited Thompson v. Chapman "with appar-
ent approval in support of the proposition that 'not all interests which indi-
viduals claim as worthy of legal protection are in fact afforded such
protection under our law."' 3 o Therefore, it seems as though New Mexico
may soon join the ranks of Washington, Iowa, and others who have judi-
cially abolished the tort of alienation of affection.
After a failed attempt to legislatively abolish the tort of alienation of
affection,' the Illinois legislature sharply limited alienation actions by
passing a statute that allows the recovery of only actual damages resulting
from the alienation of the affection of one's spouse.13 2 The Alienation of
Affection Act of Illinois provides, in part:
[T]he remedy ... provided by law for the enforcement of
the action for alienation of affection has been subjected to
grave abuses and has been used as an instrument for black-
mail by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment,
due to the indefiniteness of the damages recoverable in such
actions and the consequent fear of persons threatened with
such actions that exorbitant damages might be assessed
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Thompson v. Chapman, 600 P.2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
128. Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71 (Wash. App. 1976).
129. Thompson, 600 P.2d at 304.
130. Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Lovelace Medical Center
v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 610 (N.M. 1991)).
131. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
132. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1, et seq.
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against them. It is also . .. declared that the award of mone-
tary damages in such actions is ineffective as a recompense
for genuine mental or emotional distress.13 3
In light of these considerations, the legislature declared that the best
interests of the people of the state would be served by severely limiting the
damages recoverable in alienation actions.13" The legislature was of the
opinion that any punishment of persons guilty of the alienation of the af-
fection of another's spouse should be imposed under criminal statute and
should not be left to civil juries who are free to punish the wrongdoers by
the imposition of punitive, exemplary, vindictive, or aggravated dam-
ages." Accordingly, the Act limits recovery in alienation actions to actual
damages sustained and excludes punitive, exemplary, vindictive, or aggra-
vated damages.' 6 In addition, the statute prohibits the consideration of
certain elements in determining damages, including: the wealth or position
of the defendant or the defendant's prospects of wealth; mental anguish
suffered by the plaintiff; any injury to the plaintiff's feelings; shame, humili-
ation sorrow or mortification suffered by the plaintiff; and defamation or
injury to the good name or character of the plaintiff or dishonor to the
plaintiff's family.13 7
One of the only jurisdictions, other than Mississippi, that seems to av-
idly support the preservation of alienation actions is Utah."' When ad-
dressed with the argument for abolition of the tort in Nelson v. Jacobsen,
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the tort of alienation of affection
should remain a viable cause of action in order to adequately protect mari-
tal consortium interests.1 3 9 In Nelson, the court rationalized that, contrary
to allegations that an alienation action's purpose is to protect and preserve
the marital relationship, an alienation action actually seeks to "compensate
a spouse who has suffered loss and injury to his or her marital relationship
through the intentional interference of a third party."14 0 Accordingly, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the tort should be abolished
because it does not achieve its intended purpose."'1
The Nelson Court also stated, in response to the defendant's argument
that the tort should be abolished in light of the action's susceptibility to
abuse, that "even if some alienation actions are motivated primarily by
spite or extortion, that is no basis on which to abolish the cause of action
altogether."14 2 It further explained that the difficulty of assessing damages
and proving causation are both insufficient to deny recovery where raising
133. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1.
134. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1.
135. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1.
136. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/2; 5/3.
137. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/4.
138. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991).
139. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah 1983).
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the plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of causation and redefining the
factors bearing on damages would improve the "fairness" of the cause of
action.14 3 In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Norton v. Macfar-
lane reaffirmed the holdings of the Nelson opinion and the state still con-
tinues to recognize the tort of alienation of affection today.144
VII. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DurY
The statutes and judicial opinions that have abolished the tort of alien-
ation of affection have certainly made exceptions to the general rule. "An
exception [sometimes] arises when a defendant owes a plaintiff an indepen-
dent duty of care, such as when that defendant also has a special relation-
ship with the plaintiff." 145 For example, an alienation action may be
available where a paramour owes the plaintiff a fiduciary duty pursuant to
the paramour's status as the plaintiff's psychiatrist or marital counselor, to
refrain from any acts which would result in the alienation of the affection
of the plaintiff's spouse. 14 6 "In such an instance, the defendant does more
than just intrude into the marriage; he breaches an independent duty of
care and loyalty toward the cuckolded spouse."147 As one court has ex-
plained, the defendant paramour "is not just 'the mailman, the milkman, or
the guy next door." 148
In Destefano v. Gabrian, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld an ac-
tion which was, essentially, a claim for alienation of affection.149 However,
in Destafano, the plaintiff sued his priest, alleging that the priest engaged in
actions during marriage counseling, namely sexual intercourse with the
plaintiff's wife, that caused the dissolution of his marriage.150 The court
dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligently conducting counseling and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, since those allegations "plainly
set forth claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation."' 5'
However, because the tortfeasor owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty as his
marriage counselor, the claim for breach of fiduciary duty remained. 152
The court stated that "the nature of the counseling relationship . . . gives
rise to a clear duty on [the counselor's part] to engage only in activity or
conduct calculated to improve the [couple's] marriage." 153 The Colorado
Supreme Court added that it "should not read the statute so broadly as to
preclude any cause of action involving extramarital affairs."154 Since the
counselor breached a duty owed directly to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was,
143. Id. at 1217-18.
144. Norton, 818 P.2d at 9.
145. Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1239 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
146. Id. (citing Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75-77 (1991)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Figueiredo-Torres, 584 A.2d at 75-75).
149. Destafano v. Gabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Co. 1988).
150. Id. at 279.
151. Id. at 288.
152. Id. at 289.
153. Id. (citing Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985)).
154. Id. at 281-282.
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in effect, able to maintain an alienation of affection claim against the coun-
selor masked as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
While Colorado's Supreme Court allows for recovery in such a situa-
tion, the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressly held otherwise.5 In Strock
v. Pressnell, as in Destefano, a plaintiff husband brought suit against his
minister who allegedly engaged in an affair with the plaintiff's wife while
the couple was seeking marital counseling." The Ohio Supreme Court
stated with respect to the plaintiff husband's claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, that "it is not the conduct but the results of the conduct which are
sought to be compensated, the result being estrangement of the spouse and
implied sexual relations of the spouse."157 The court found that "[s]uch
clearly falls within [the statute abolishing claims for criminal conversation
and alienation of affection]" and accordingly dismissed the claim."5
VIII. ALIENATION OF AFFECTION IN MISSISSIPPI
The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed one of the first actions in
Mississippi for the alienation of a spouse's affection in 1927.15' In Brister v.
Dunaway, the plaintiff spouse brought an action against his wife's par-
amour for alienation of his wife's affection and criminal conversation. 160
The Brister Court addressed the requirements to sustain an action for crim-
inal conversation, but was not as forthcoming with regard to the require-
ments to sustain an action for alienation of affection.161 The court later
clarified those requirements in its 1932 decision in Stanton v. Cox.16 2 In
Stanton, the court stated:
In order to sustain an action for the alienation of the
[spouse's] affection it must appear, in addition to the fact of
alienation or the facts of the [alienated spouse's] affection
for the defendant, that there had been a direct interference
on the defendant's part, sufficient to satisfy the jury that the
alienation was caused by the defendant. . . [T]he plaintiff
must show that there was a direct interference upon the
upon the part of the defendant that not only was there infat-
uation of the [spouse] for the defendant, but that the defen-
dant by wrongful act was the cause of it.163
155. Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (Ohio 1988).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1243.
158. Id. at 1243-44.
159. Phillip Sykes, Intentional Torts - Alienation of Affection - An Inference of Defendant's Inten-
tional Interference in Plaintiffs Marital Relations is Sufficient to Prove Alienation, 63 Miss. L.J. 249, 255
(1993) (citing Brister v. Dunaway, 115 So. 36 (Miss. 1927)). See also Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d
1214, 1218 (Miss. 1992).
160. Brister v. Dunaway, 115 So. 36, 37 (Miss. 1927).
161. Id. at 38.
162. Sykes, supra note 159, at 256-57 (citing Stanton v. Cox, 139 So. 458 (Miss. 1932)).
163. Stanton v. Cox, 139 So. 458, 460-461 (Miss. 1932) (internal citations omitted).
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The Stanton Court also suggested that the purpose of an alienation
action was to preserve the marital relationship, stating that "[s]o long as a
husband and wife are living together, strangers who interfere with their
marital relations, even though the domestic relation has become strained,
must know that they cannot accept propositions which lead to the dissolu-
tion of the matrimonial tie."' 64
Almost seventy years later, in Overstreet v. Merlos, a defendant par-
amour expressed the need for abolition of the tort of alienation of affection
in support of the lower court's dismissal of an alienation claim made
against him.165 In response, the Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized
the antiquated nature of alienation actions, but summarily stated that
"[p]recedent supports common law alienation claims and the circuit court is
bound to follow such."1 66 In Overstreet, because the lower court dismissed
the alienation action against the paramour on other grounds, the Supreme
Court refused to address the need for abolition of the tort.167 The court
explained that "[e]ven antiquated causes of action have to be nullified by
judicial fiat."1 68
Two years after Overstreet, the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted for
the second time the outdated nature of the tort of alienation of affection. 169
However, in Saunders v. Alford, the court again found that it was not con-
cerned with the tort of alienation of affection since the lower court ruled in
favor of the appellant on the issue of alienation and addressed only the
issue of abolition of the tort of criminal conversation.1 7 0
In Saunders, the plaintiff spouse brought an action against his wife's
paramour for the alienation of her affection and criminal conversation.17 1
Justice Banks, writing for the majority, recognized that these so called
'heart balm' torts have been abolished by a majority of jurisdictions, and
that it was within the court's discretion to likewise judicially abolish such
common law torts in Mississippi.172 In abolishing the tort of criminal con-
versation, the court noted that the right sought to be protected by the tort
is "the exclusive right of one spouse to sexual intercourse with the
other." 7 3 According to the court, the tort of criminal conversation "comes
closest in form to a strict liability tort" since all that must be proven is that
the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the plaintiff's spouse without
the plaintiff's permission.174 The court reasoned that the tort of criminal
164. Id. at 461.
165. Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Miss. 1990).
166. Id. at 1198 (citing Camp v. Roberts, 462 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1985)).
167. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1218 (Miss. 1992) (citing Overstreet, 570 So. 2d at 1198).
168. Overstreet, 570 So. 2d at 1198 (Miss. 1990).
169. Saunders, 607 So. 2d 1214.
170. Id. at 1218.
171. Id. at 1215.
172. Id. at 1215-1216, 1219.
173. Id. at 1216 (quoting Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Iowa 1978)).
174. Id. at 1215 (citing Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. 1976)).
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conversation has "outlived its usefulness" and cited logic for its abolish-
ment that echoed the very same reasons that other jurisdictions have pro-
posed in support of the abolishment of the tort of alienation of affection,
including the tort's lack of preservation of the marital relationship and
growing abusive use of the actions as a means for vindication.17 While the
court did not abolish the tort of alienation of affection, the Saunders opin-
ion nonetheless confirms the court's power to abolish the tort of alienation
of affection and the reasons given by the Saunders Court in support of the
abolition of criminal conversation apply equally to the abolition of aliena-
tion actions.
Finally, in the 1999 case of Bland v. Hill, the issue of abolishment of
the tort of alienation of affection was properly before the Mississippi Su-
preme Court.17 6 In Bland, the plaintiff husband filed a complaint against
his wife's paramour for compensation for the loss of the affection of his
wife.177 At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff spouse $200,000 in dam-
ages.17s The defendant paramour appealed and asked the court to abolish
the tort of alienation of affection.179
Justice Pittman, writing for the majority, began by stating that the pur-
pose of an alienation action is to protect "the love, society, companionship,
and comfort that form the foundation of marriage."so The court outlined
the elements of proof required to maintain an action for the alienation of a
spouse's affection - wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, a loss
by the plaintiff spouse of the affection or consortium of his or her spouse
and particularly, "a causal connection between such conduct and the loss"
- and commented on the difference between an alienation action and an
action for criminal conversation.' Noting its earlier abolition of the tort
of criminal conversation and its refusal to extend that abolition to include
the tort of alienation of affection, the court again cited to the tort's in-
tended purpose to protect the underlying foundation of marriage.182 Re-
fusing to abolish the tort, the court stated that it "believe[s] that the marital
relationship is an important element in the foundation of out society [and
t]o abolish the tort of alienation of affection would, in essence, send the
message that [the court is] devaluing the marriage relationship.""
Justice McRae, dissenting in part,184 stated that while he agrees that
the marital relationship is an important foundation of society, he disagrees
175. Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1215-1218.
176. Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999).
177. Id. at 415.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 417 (citing Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1215).
181. Id. (citing Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1215-1216).
182. Bland, 735 So. 2d at 417-18 (citing Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1215).
183. Id. at 418.
184. Justice McRae concurred with the majority's evidentiary ruling regarding the underlying
alienation suit but believed that this opportunity should have been taken "to abrogate once and for all
the tort known as alienation of affection." Bland, 735 So.2d at 425-26 (McRae, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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with the majority's statement that abolishment of the tort of alienation of
affection would send the wrong message to the people of the state.18 5 Ac-
cording to Justice McRae, citing to the Wyman, Fundermann, and O'Neil
opinions discussed supra,1 8 6 "[t]he alienation suit is an anachronism which
[the court] would do well to rid [themselves] of."18  He added that such
suits "have afforded a fertile field for blackmail and extortion by means of
manufacturing suits in which the threat of publicity is used to force a settle-
ment"18 8 and "[a] wealth of experience has demonstrated that these law-
suits so much more harm to society than good."189
In response to Justice McRae's position, Justice Smith, in his concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice Banks and joined in part by Justice Waller,
stated that in light of the Saunders Court's abolishment of criminal conver-
sation, an action for alienation of affection is the only legal remedy for an
injured spouse where a third party has wrongfully interfered with his or her
marriage.190 According to Justice Smith, abrogation of the tort would leave
injured spouses who were otherwise entitled to compensation without a
means of redress for the wrongful act of interference committed upon him
or her, resulting in the demise of his or her marriage.191 He added that the
dissent's argument in support of abolishment of alienation actions is
"somewhat akin to the view that 'everybody else is doing it, so should I;'"
and that Mississippi should not "get aboard this runaway train." 192
The issue of abolition of the tort was brought before the Court of Ap-
peals of Mississippi in 2001.'93 In Gorman v. McMahon, the appellate
court cited Bland and summarily dismissed the issue, stating that the appel-
lant was simply asking the court to "address a question that the Mississippi
Supreme Court has previously answered." 194 However, in 2007, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court again took it upon themselves to readdress whether
the tort of alienation of affection should be abolished and declined to do
so. 195
In Fitch v. Valentine, the plaintiff spouse brought an action against his
wife's paramour who engaged in an adulterous affair with his wife, impreg-
nated her, and allegedly offered his wife money and gifts in an effort to
persuade her to end the matrimony.196 The wife, however, testified that
her affection for her husband had expired before the adulterous relation-
ship commenced and that the adulterous relationship with the defendant
185. Bland, 735 So. 2d at 427 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See discussion supra Part IV.
187. Bland, 735 So. 2d at 427 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 426 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting PROSSER AND KEE-
TON, supra note 16 at 229).
189. Id. at 427 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Gorman v. McMahon, 792 So. 2d 307 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
194. Gorman, 792 So. 2d at 318 (citing Bland, 735 So. 2d at 417-18).
195. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 2007).
196. Id. at 1015-17.
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was itself the result of her unhappy marriage to her husband.197 At the
trial of the matter, the jury unanimously found in favor of the plaintiff hus-
band and awarded him $642,000 in actual damages and $112,500 in punitive
damages against the defendant. 198 The defendant paramour appealed and
argued that the court "should abolish the tort of alienations as a matter of
public policy."1 99
Justice Randolph, writing for the majority, cited favorably to Justice
Smith's statement in Bland v. Hill that Mississippi should not jump on the
abolition bandwagon, leaving an offended spouse without a means of re-
covery "for the wrongful conduct of a third party who willfully and inten-
tionally interferes in and aids in destroying a marriage." 200 The court
explained the justification and need for the viability of the tort of aliena-
tion of affection by stating that "[i]n addition to protecting the marriage
relationship and its sanctity, the tort of alienation of affection also provides
an appropriate remedy for the intentional conduct which causes a loss of
consortium." 201 Justice Randolph commented that where a person is in-
jured by the negligent acts of another, the injured person's spouse often has
a separate claim for loss of consortium and therefore, it would be inconsis-
tent law to allow a spouse to recover for the loss of consortium caused by a
third party's negligence, but refuse to allow a spouse to recover for the
same loss caused by a third party's intentional act, as does an alienation
action.20 2 In conclusion, the court affirmed the judgment and damages
awards and again stated that "in the interest of protecting the marriage
relationship and providing a remedy for intentional conduct which causes a
loss of consortium, this Court declines the invitation to abolish the com-
mon law tort of alienation of affection in Mississippi. "203
Justice Dickinson specially concurred, boldly expressing his dissatisfac-
tion with the majority's decision to sustain the tort of alienation of affec-
tion, stated:
In my view, Mississippi should abandon the five other states
which continue to fully recognize the antiquated common
law tort of alienation of affection and join the other forty-
two states who refuse to do so.... Nevertheless, I have been
unsuccessful in persuading the benevolent majority which
holds that the ancient and infirm cause of action shall con-
tinue to breathe in Mississippi. That said, I shall respect the
majority's decision and apply the law to alienation of affec-
tion cases which find their way here, including the case
197. Id. at 1017.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1018.
200. Id. at 1019 (quoting Bland, 745 So.2d at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring)).
201. Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1020 (citing Bland, 735, So.2d at 418).
202. Id. (quoting Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Mo. 2003) (Benton, J., dissenting)).
203. Id.
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before us today. First, however, I shall state my case for
abolition of the cause of action.20 4
Justice Dickinson went on to discuss the historical backdrop upon
which the tort was founded and noted the change in the rationale for the
action from a means of compensation for lost "property" to a means of
preserving marriages and discouraging third-party interference there-
with. 2 05 Like other supporters of abolition, Justice Dickinson found the
current rationale underlying the tort to be a legal fiction - stating several
times that the tort does not, in fact, preserve or stabilize a marital union.206
In addition, Justice Dickinson observed that (1) spousal affection is not a
form of property that one can own or for the loss of which, a person should
recover;20 7 (2) although an alienation action is theoretically compensatory,
"the true nature of the claim is punitive," as evidenced by the vindictive
motives primarily cited for the initiation of alienation actions and the tool
for extortion and blackmail that alienation actions have become;208 (3) any
injuries that might have been caused by the wrongful conduct are not de-
terred by an alienation action, but rather, are exacerbated by the process of
the action; 2 0 9 and (4) "no clear standards for compensating the plaintiff
exist[, opening] the door for ... awards .. . usually tainted by passion and
prejudice." 2 1 0 Accordingly, Justice Dickinson opined that Mississippi rec-
ognize that alienation actions have "outlived any relevance or usefulness
they may have once possessed," and urged the court to abolish the tort.21
IX. CONCLUSION
Mississippi should abolish the tort of alienation of a spouse's affection,
just as it has abolished the tort of criminal conversation. The warped ratio-
nale upon which the tort relies is nothing more than fiction - alienation
actions do not protect marriages from wrongful interference. While to
abolish the tort of alienation of affection would leave an injured spouse
without a means of redress for the wrongful interference with his or her
marriage, one must question the extent that such injuries can be adequately
compensated by a monetary award. Moreover, alienation actions have fu-
eled vicious out of court settlements in an effort to preserve the reputations
of the parties involved. These considerations alone outweigh the need for
preservation of the action, if such a need exists. Accordingly, the legisla-
ture and/or courts of Mississippi should take heed to the opinions of Jus-
tices McRae and Dickinson and follow the national trend in abolishing the
tort of alienation of affection. Alternatively, the legislature or judiciary
204. Id. at 1030 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring) (internal citation omitted).
205. Id. at 1030-31 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring).
206. Id. at 1032-35 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring).
207. Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1033 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1034-135 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring) (internal citations omitted).
211. Id. at 1036 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring) (citing Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1219).
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should severely limit the amount of damages potentially recoverable in an
alienation action in order to curtail the abuse that the action has become so
susceptible to.

